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1	APPEARANCES: (Continued)
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23	PROCEEDINGS
24	(REPORTER'S NOTE: The following telephone
25	conference was held remotely, beginning at 1:03 p.m.)

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THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. Magistrate Judge Sherry Fallon joining the conference call in Chervon Limited versus One World Technologies, et al. This is the time set aside for a discovery dispute, and I do appreciate counsel adjusting the time to start this later this afternoon. Let's start with appearances for the record. First, I need to confirm that I have a court stenographer on the line. THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor. This is Brian. All right. Thank you, Mr. Gaffigan. THE COURT: Do I have my law clerk, Ms. Polito, on the line? THE LAW CLERK: Yes, Your Honor. I'm on the line. Thank you. All right. THE COURT: Then let's start with appearances on the counsel beginning with Delaware counsel, starting with the plaintiff, Chervon (HK) Limited. MR. SCHLADWEILER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is Ben Schladweiler from Greenberg Traurig on behalf of the Chervon plaintiffs. I'm joined today by James Lukas and Matthew Levinstein, both from our Chicago office. MR. LUKAS: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.

1 MR. LEVINSTEIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Yes, for me. Thank you. 3 All right. Okay. Let me just make notes of who is on the call. 4 5 All right. And now for the defendants, starting with Delaware counsel. 6 7 MR. BIGGS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This 8 is Brian Biggs from DLA Piper on behalf of the defendants. 9 With me on the line are my colleagues also from DLA Piper, 10 Sean Cunningham, Erin Gibson, and Damon Lewis. 11 MR. CUNNINGHAM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LEWIS: Good afternoon. 13 14 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. 15 All right. I have read what amounts to I guess roughly 24 pages of arguments regarding a number of 16 17 discovery disputes and literally hundreds of pages of 18 exhibits that I received in a very short span of time from 19 January 4th. 20 I can't represent to all of you that I have my 21 arms around the exhibits in their entirety, so you can help me on this dispute in a number of ways. 22 23 First of all, I'm asking for succinct and 24 direct argument specifically identifying what the moving 25 party claims is sufficient about the other party's discovery

responses.

I'm trying to cut through much of the background information. I understand what the nature of this patent case is. I understand there is a large number of patents, the accused products, generally, very generally speaking involve lawnmowers.

I do have an understanding from reading the papers of much of the background and given the number of issues we have to get through this afternoon, it's not going to be helpful to have it proceed as if it were an oral argument on summary judgment.

Let's go directly to the issues, the alleged deficiencies and what each side has to say about them.

We'll go issue by issue. I'll go in the chronology that the briefs were filed, so we'll start with the defendant One World's issues, vis-à-vis the plaintiffs first.

And we'll go issue by issue within that moving submission. So we'll start, in other words, with Interrogatory No. 8 and the alleged deficiencies in the response and then when that is resolved; we'll move on to Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 14, attempt to resolve those, et cetera. And we'll proceed in the same fashion with respect to plaintiffs' issues.

And then at the conclusion of our conference

today, I'm going to make some rulings with respect to management of the next discovery conference that we're going to have on January 28th because I do not want to be in the same position of having to manage such a large number of disputes. And by my count, looking at Document Items No. 126 and 147, which I believe are all plaintiffs' disputes, there are essentially approximately 12 disputes teed up already on that date. And we're going to have to be more efficient about that, but we can discuss that at the end of the call.

So turning first to One World's issues and
Interrogatory No. 8. Let me hear briefly on that point and
let me ask an initial question which may help streamline the
argument.

On the first page of Document Item No. 140, the argument is made that, with respect to Chervon's response incorporating the briefs that it filed with the PTAB, the argument made by the defendants is that they cover only a subset of the prior art charted by defendants in their initial invalidity contention, and final infringement contentions that were served. And the conclusory argument is that Chervon has not served any validity contentions regarding most prior art charted by One World and that therefore the response is "insufficient".

I have to say this tells me nothing specifically

about what specific deficiencies defendants are pointing to that need to be corrected by the Court, by Order of the Court, so please address that.

MR. LEWIS: Your Honor, Damon Lewis for the defendants. I'll try to address it succinctly.

The one -- (inaudible) talks about Chervon identifying each claim element that may contain prior art references that the defendants represented to them. So when, when Chervon only gives us incorporation by reference to the file given at the PTAB, they actually missed at least five of the charts that we have provided them and therefore have given us no claim-element-by-claim-element analysis of at least five different prior art combinations we presented to them.

We need to know from them what is deficient about our allegations that these patents are invalid during the fact discovery period by the expert discovery later on.

THE COURT: First of all, just technical difficulties. You are sounding a little bit muffled, so I'm not sure if you can rearrange the arrangement in a manner you're addressing the Court. I'll ask if everyone else who is not speaking to put their microphones on mute, I'll put mine on mute, all of you, so we don't have a lot of background noise.

You are coming across a bit muffled. I did hear

you speaking, but my question substantively is what, when you mentioned five different prior art references in combination, where are they identified for the Court in this moving submission, Document Item No. 140? And more importantly, where have they ever been specifically pointed out to the plaintiffs in any meet and confers or follow-up emails to meet and confers?

MR. LEWIS: Your Honor, I apologize for the technical glitch. I switched over to a speakerphone.

Can you confirm?

THE COURT: That's better.

MR. LEWIS: I sound better now? Okay.

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

MR. LEWIS: Okay.

THE COURT: Sorry, but I can't hear you. I don't know if you're on mute.

MR. LEWIS: No, Your Honor. I can begin.

So in our discovery letter of October 8th, we informed Chervon that the answer to Interrogatory 8 was insufficient, particularly noting that they don't explain how any claim element was not rendered obvious by the prior art disclosed by One World.

I would agree, Your Honor, that I have not given them a reference-by-reference list of the art. That was not included in their response. But I would represent to the

Court that it is readily knowable looking at the fact that the response that Chervon provided was only to a subset of the much more copious argument provided in the invalidity contentions.

THE COURT: All right. I just want to confirm for the record. I think I know who is speaking. It is Mr. Damon Lewis; correct?

MR. LEWIS: Yes, that is me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And I'm sorry as I missed it when you stated your name before you began your presentation.

And I would ask that everybody, because we are by telephone, even if it gets redundant, just please state your name when you start to speak so the court reporter and I have an accurate understanding of who is speaking.

So my question, Mr. Lewis is, how do you expect the plaintiffs to correct the deficiency if you are not giving them any type of notice of, hey, here is five different prior art references, combinations of them that we've included in our invalidity contentions, and you have not addressed them? You know, how are they to know how you want them to correct this if it's not spelled out for them?

MR. LEWIS: Your Honor, thank you for the question. I believe that we have sought out for them

because we actually have given them a set of actual claim charts for them to address, and they only addressed a subset of these. So we told them to address everything in the chart. They so far have refused.

THE COURT: Doesn't some of this overlap with opinions that will be expressed by experts? And isn't the idea -- well, let me just leave it there.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, Your Honor. I do believe that there will be significant expert testimony on these particular issues, but we are presenting our expert reports first, and we'll be doing so in the blind with respect to several of the charts that we provided to Chervon already. Because we don't know what they believe is our deficiencies in our charts.

What we're not asking at this point in time is for them to provide us expert testimony. The testimony that was supplemented, that we're asking for. So we believe that Chervon is at the point where we're asking for a sneak peak of expert testimony that is actually claimed.

THE COURT: All right. I will hear from Chervon.

MR. LUKAS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. James
Lukas on behalf of Chervon.

I think the big issue is -- and I'm happy there were some things clarified. This is a situation, as the

of additional response to this Interrogatory No. 8.

Court is well aware, where the defendants filed nine IPRs.

So there is -- and we incorporate a lot of material from those IPRs, a lot of briefing, a lot of applications, a lot of expert testimony. I want to say maybe 500-to-700 pages

I'm not aware of specific charts or prior art that we do not address. I can tell you that as is typical, usually a defendant brings forth its most important art in an IPR, and we have addressed all of those in this response.

I will say maybe just to kind of cut to the chase, although not at issue here, they recently served, defendants recently served final invalidity contentions. We are willing and plan to supplement our response to address some new prior art that wasn't in the IPRs or the PTRs.

And to the extent there is any additional supplementation required with respect to these unidentified charts or combinations, we will also provide factual supplements at that time. And I think we can get that done definitely by the end of -- within two weeks or three weeks.

And primarily to address the final invalidity contentions which were not at issue in this discovery response, but I figure, you know, why not just, if there is anything else hanging out there, we will get them all the factual response we can provide for prior art references or combinations in two-to-three weeks.

I can give you, if you want me to give you -- I mean we can do it by the 28th, without a problem. But I think what is really important, and I think we kind of clarified it now, is we will provide factual, any factual information we can provide in this response and not expert testimony. This is -- most of this is obviousness analysis. I think all of it is, which, right, you know, involves expert testimony.

We don't have that expert testimony now so we can't incorporate it or provide it there. It's their burden. The patent claims are presumed valid. And until we get their expert testimony, we can't really provide any responsive expert testimony.

That being said, once that happens, and we do provide responsive expert testimony, we'll also incorporate that into a response later down the line.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lewis, anything further?

MR. LEWIS: Your Honor, if they're agreeing to supplement and address all the charts, including the charts we have added for our final contentions, then I believe this does resolve the dispute with thanks to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. I will order that this dispute at this time is moot, and that I will expect the plaintiffs will follow through with their representations

today that they will supplement responses to address new prior art in the defendants' final invalidity contentions and correct anything that spills over potentially from this dispute at that time when they do that.

And I will ask that that supplementation be done on or before January 28th. And if, at that time, the supplementation has not been done, and we have our next teleconference on the 28th, the plaintiffs can be prepared to explain why it wasn't done or what additional time is reasonably necessary to complete it, if it needs additional time, which I hope it will not be in a position to need. But in any event, I will expect that supplementation on or before January 28th.

Let's move on then to the issues concerning

Interrogatory 13 -- well, let's do them separately, 13 and

14. So let's address 13 first.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, Your Honor. Again, Damon Lewis for the defendants.

Interrogatory No. 13 asks for Chervon to supply a limitations-by-limitations explanation for how each of their commercial embodiments meets the claims that they are asserting.

So this is actually a part of a longer running back and forth between One World and Chervon about marking and ancillary items. And we reach back to a discussion of

Interrogatory 2, which is not part of this dispute. We can see we got to where we are by increment.

And in responding to Interrogatory No. 2,

Chervon eventually gave us a response that they incorporated into Interrogatory No. 13 that supplied a 130 page exhibit explaining various features of a representative device and how they may claim that it meets the patent limitations.

The problem with their disclosure is that it is not actually legible because it does not give the weight markers that you would expect in a claim chart or some other kind of prose. We asked them to produce an answer, limitation by limitation, but Chervon's answer does not actually include the limitations that this 138 page table is discussing, and so it requires us to guess.

When we look at this chart --

THE COURT: I have it in front of me. I'm actually looking at their second supplemental objections and responses to first set of interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 2 which does attach that 138 pages. Actually, Exhibit 1 to Document Item No. 150, which goes along with their response to this discovery dispute.

And to me, these are very detailed. You know, they're not -- granted, they're not in the two column format potentially of a claim chart. But, No. 1, you haven't cited to me, defendants haven't cited any authority which requires

the plaintiffs to respond in that type of format.

Secondly, you haven't pointed out where any of the deficiencies are in these 138 pages given the fact that you have within these 138 pages images of the representative Chervon products along with indications of where the claim limitations are located on those products. And, you know, they're readily, the claims are readily searchable in the patents-in-suit, so I'm not following where the specific deficiencies are here.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, Your Honor.

So One World is not asking that Chervon produce an answer to the interrogatory in any particular format.

The format that they have chosen is very similar to a claim chart which suggested to us that they were going to follow that kind of traditional, but that is something that would be responsive to this interrogatory.

And so we're not asking, though, to be constrained to a traditional claim chart, but what we are asking is that they actually identical the claim limitation.

The interrogatory asks for Chervon to identify the limitation-by-limitation basis of how each limitation is met. I don't see how you can do that, Your Honor, without actually telling us which claim limitation each page or each cell was talking about, and so we are required to guess.

Now, some of these I admit will be easier to

guess than others. For instance, on page 1 of 138, the limitation in claim 1 of the '463 patent is a slide triggered baking switch mechanism.

That is fantastic. That drawing shows exactly what we are referring to. But if we go through other pages on this document, the limitations are not readily apparent. And so all we're asking for them to do is, you know, they can start with this chart if they want to annotate it with the claim limitation that they are referring to on this page or they can produce some other way, whichever is most efficient for them. But what they have provided us so far does not actually one inform the reader what claim limitation on this limitation-by-limitation response they're actually referring to on that page.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me similarly to page 1 of 138, there are other pages throughout this exhibit that do reference what appear to be claim limitations. And it would seem to me, as the moving party, claiming that discovery is, that this is deficient, there is, at a bare bones, the defendants should have collected what pages are ambiguous or need clarification in order to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to correct those pages because obviously, as you said, page 1 doesn't need correction. And to the extent there are numerous or pages similar to claim 1 that arguably do not need correction, simply to come here

with a general request for a do-over, it seems to be overbroad and unnecessary in light of the fact that the defendants have admittedly been able to understand what claim limitations are supposed to be represented in these pages.

So, again, I'll ask, can you point me to any exhibits that you supplied on behalf of the moving submission that indicate that defendants asked the plaintiffs to clarify ambiguous or otherwise unintelligible representations about what claim limitations were supposed to be depicted in this response?

MR. LEWIS: I think, Your Honor, what I would like to do is to offer to meet and confer with the others on the other side so we can tell them exactly what pages we are unable to determine are attached to particular limitations.

THE COURT: All right. And I would ask you to do that promptly so that this issue does not carry over into the discovery dispute on January 28th. Thank you.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let's move on to

Interrogatory No. 14, compliance with the patent marking statute.

MR. LEWIS: Your Honor, Damon Lewis for defendants again.

So Interrogatory No. 14 is asking Chervon to

help us understand exactly how their 25 commercial embodiments that they claim are marked by patent were actually marked, how they were marked, and when they were marked, and what percentage of the sales that Chervon made from each of these commercial embodiments for such a marking.

The focus of this interrogatory is on the commercial embodiment. We are asking Chervon to present us information, embodiment by embodiment, that has this information.

Chervon instead indicated in their response information about particular patents. Information about particular patents is not particularly helpful because it doesn't tell us what commercial embodiment was marked by which patents and when and how many were sold that did or did not have that information in an interrogatory.

So we're asking Chervon to, again, address this focusing on the commercial embodiment and how it was marked as opposed to when they began marking particular patents.

This is a particularly relevant interrogatory because it speaks very strongly towards damages. Under the marking provisions of the Patent Act, Chervon is going to be limited to damages for any infringement that they have incurred before they began marking.

The marking also requires that the patentee that

sells these products marked essentially all the products that they sell or have allowed to be sold on their behalf.

And so with respect to this interrogatory, this interrogatory actually has the potential to severely limit the damages or damages period for each of the nine patents.

THE COURT: I understand the reason that you are seeking it. But again going back to my original request, if you don't mind, specifically tell me what is deficient.

I'm going to hear I believe from Chervon, because they said it in their papers that defendants haven't identified any specific product that they believe to be unmarked. And in looking at this interrogatory response and referring -- and for purposes of the record, I'm referring to Document Item No. 141, which is the declaration that went with defendants' moving submission, I'm looking at Exhibit 4, pages 12 through 13. And from what I can see of these responses -- and you are free to point out if I'm misreading them or misinterpreting them. In terms of the location where the marking appears on the product, it appears that the interrogatory response satisfies that portion of the request.

The time period during which each product
was sold with such marking from Chevron -- or, I'm sorry,
Chervon proposed on its letter submission, it looks like
it's willing to cure that alleged deficiency. The

percentage of the product model sold with such marking versus sold without such marking, again, they have represented that its marked 100 percent of its newly manufactured product as of the identified dates and have continuously marked its newly manufactured products with a patent as of those dates.

So again putting this all together from the Court's view, it's hard for me to see specifically what the deficiencies are. And you have given me -- and I don't dispute your recitation of the law with respect to patent marking, but this is a discovery dispute. You have got to show me what is missing and ask how you would like the Court to order it corrected.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, Your Honor.

So the main deficiency here is that Chervon's response is focused on the patent. They marked something, for instance. They marked something with the '463 patent since at least August 29, 2016. What the interrogatory is asking is which products that they sold or are allowed to have sold were marked with the '463 patent.

They have not answered that. They have not answered that completely.

The background issue with respect to this interrogatory is that Chervon has nine patents in this case, and they were not issued all at the same time.

Looking at just their commercial embodiments known as the LM2100, which has been on sale for many years. In fact, One World purchased one in February 2020. So I could analyze it ourselves.

This product has been on the market I believe since 2015. And if I can say, and opposing counsel can correct me, during the span of time that the 2100 has been on the market, new patents have issued. So this interrogatory is asking, did you update the label on the 2100 to reflect the new patent?

Chervon's answer does not indicate that.

Chervon's answer only tells us that they started marking things with the '463 on August 29, 2016, and they go through the rest of the patent they allegedly had marked.

So if they failed to update the markings on products that continue to be sold, then it has not marked substantially all of the products. So that is what this interrogatory is seeking to get.

Now, they do, they explain that 100 percent of the newly manufactured products as of the dates listed above were marked.

That is actually unhelpful. The product -- I'm sorry. The marking requirement doesn't care so much about when a product was manufactured but what was it marked with when it was sold, when it was presented to the world, when

it was put on sale.

And so Chervon telling us 100 percent of duly manufactured products were marked is not a marking -- is not related to the requirements of 287. And more importantly, it's not responsive to the interrogatories we've asked.

THE COURT: But have you identified any specific products on behalf of the defendants to Chervon that defendants believe to be unmarked? And if not, why not?

If you feel, the client feels that it is not their obligation to have to do that for purposes of seeking discovery about them, then give me the legal authority that you rely on for that.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, Your Honor. So Chervon indicated for the first time that it was relying on the Arctic Cat case to shift the burden to One World in its motion response that was submitted to Your Honor. That was the first time that Chervon indicated to us that it wanted us to point out any deficiencies in the marking before they would answer this interrogatory fully.

That could be easily answered. For one, they have produced at the Bates numbers that are listed on page 12 of their response several marking labels, and these labels include other things like for purposes of discussion include markings of patents.

They include, at Chervon 4818, and 4819, labels that were applied ostensibly to the LM2100 that I referred to earlier. Those markings end in 2017. But the 21 -- I'm sorry, the LM2100 continued to be on sale for years after that, including the copy we purchased in 2020.

So there is a prima facie case presented by their own documents. And if they fail to update the markings on the 2100, then they have not complied with the Section 287.

If they had informed us that this was the information still awaiting for us to share with them, we could have shared it with them at that point in time.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Chervon.

MR. LUKAS: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon. James Lukas again for Chervon.

I'm going to -- I'm even more confused than I was earlier. We believe Chervon's response is more than sufficient. It goes through and talks about the products that are embodiments by incorporating Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 4. 1, you know, it's talking, 1 lists all the embodiments, I think, or the sales, dates and times, and then 4 I think lists all the embodiments. And it tells them when the products were started to be marked. You know, everything that was manufactured.

I was really confused about manufactured versus

sold. When they were manufactured, I mean I don't know if there is some accusation that they were removed after they were manufactured but before they were sold, but we haven't heard anything about that.

The point is we think this is more than, more than sufficient to respond to those interrogatories. We did offer to actually add the dates from the incorporated document just to make it more, you know, more detailed, and we will do that.

The one thing I'm a little confused about, I think there is some confusion about the law. Marking only deals with pre -- the pre-notice period, so that might be a part of defendants' confusion.

So really all that matters is what was marked by the patents that were issued at that time and before we ever filed suit. That's all that matters because once we filed suit, you know, they're on notice. So it's all that pre-notice period.

So I think we're talking about from when they started, we started, patents were issued, the first patent was issued in suit to the date of the first -- of the lawsuit or the amended complaint. I think the lawsuit.

Excuse me. So that, yes, I think that kind of clears that legal confusion.

But, again, you know, we do bring up that it's

their burden. I think we have done, defendants -- excuse me. Plaintiffs have done more than enough to respond to this. We are willing to add dates of first sale to the agreement -- excuse me, to the supplemental response. And we can do that by the 28th.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything further, Mr. Lewis?

MR. LEWIS: Yes. I'm actually not sure that

Chervon's suggested supplement is helpful in any way. Maybe

-- I'll leave it at that. I'm not sure what they have

suggested. For one, yes, Chervon is trying to -- well, they

have alleged that they complied with the marking statute in

order to get damages from before the complaint.

If their evidence is only from 2016 and 2017 and there is a two year gap from 2017 until when they filed the complaint in 2019 for which there is no evidence that they marked, say, the 2100 with several of the patents-in-suit, we need to know that. And that is what this interrogatory is asking.

Secondly, the date of first sale, they have already supplied that first via other discovery responses. That is not what we're asking here. We're not asking for when the product was sold. We're asking for at each point, at each period of time that the product was sold where there was a patent in force, was it marked on that product?

So Chervon suggested that they will supplement to add dates on which the products were first sold. They have not centered this response on the 25 commercial embodiments that they claim to have and what various marking those 25 commercial embodiments exhibited for what period, and whether or not that's the total number of sales that they have for that embodiment as to substantially all of the marked product.

I actually said that backwards. I don't think that they have addressed at all whether the products that were marked when a patent was in force covered substantially all the products that were sold during that period.

MR. LUKAS: Your Honor, just can I just briefly respond?

THE COURT: You may briefly respond. It may help me.

MR. LUKAS: Yes, Your Honor. I think what is happening is I think the defendants are trying to make some type of, maybe it's a summary judgment legal argument, and want us to respond to it in a discovery response that isn't, you know, doesn't request that kind of information.

We fully responded to the interrogatory we believe. I'm very confused as to what additional information we can provide, so I don't know if that helps, but ...

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LEWIS: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Very briefly, Mr. Lewis; and I'm ready to make a ruling on this. Thank you.

MR. LEWIS: All right. So the Arctic Cat case we have been discussing is actually pretty clear. That marking is something that is within the province of the patentee. It is something that the patentee would know that the accused infringers were on notice.

So it is very incumbent, if we were ever to produce a summary judgment motion on this, that Chervon give us as full of an answer they possibly can for this interrogatory to show their product was marked with all the patents that this patent claimed to practice at every period of time when the patents were in force. Their answer is not doing that right now.

and heard the arguments of counsel on this, I'm going to deny the motion to compel in part and grant it in part with respect to the portion that Chervon indicated in its answering submission that it was willing to supplement.

I will order Chervon to supplement its response to this marking interrogatory, Interrogatory No. 14 by providing a list that first sale dates for each of its commercial embodiments and confirming that each of those commercial embodiments were marked with patents that they practice, and

to do that on or before January 28th.

With respect to the overall relief that the defendant is seeking in term of a response to the interrogatory, I agree that as Chervon pointed out this is sounding more in the nature of a summary judgment or legal argument to me rather than a discovery dispute issue.

You're wanting to hear from -- defendants want
Chervon to make a legal argument with respect to application
of the application of the patent marking statute rather
than discovery. And as the Court indicated on this record,
I've looked at their discovery responses and feel satisfied
in reviewing them that they have answered the pertinent
information with location of marking, percentage of product
models sold. The only thing potentially lacking is
supplementation of a time period during which each product
was sold with the marking and they're willing to do that and
supplement as I have ordered.

So on that basis, my ruling stands.

And let me just state for the record now so I don't have to keep repeating it:

All the rulings I make today with respect to the discovery disputes are going to be bench rulings such that the transcript will serve as the Order of the Court. I won't be issuing a separate written order to go along with this conference.

Therefore, the parties are subject to Rule 72(a) with respect to the time frame for taking timely objections up to the District Judge on any of my orders today. And the District Judge will review them pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether they're clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

So with that, I think that satisfies all of the issues that were briefed in the letter briefing that was submitted by the defendants, or -- yes, by the defendants with respect to alleged deficiencies in the plaintiffs' interrogatory responses with respect to Interrogatories 8, 13, and 14.

I will now turn over to the next discovery dispute that was chronologically briefed in the letter briefing format. And those are the disputes that the plaintiff raised against Chervon -- I mean against defendant One World with respect to the previous court order on the parties' stipulation resolving a prior discovery dispute. At least, that is the first issue that was raised. So let me know who will argue that on behalf of the plaintiffs.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

This is Matthew Levinstein. And I will be arguing on behalf of the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Very well. Just give me a moment to grab those documents, of which I have hard copies. It's

easier for me to work with the hard copies when we're doing this telephonically, so just give me a moment.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: No problem. I'm doing the same thing electronically right now.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: All right. I have them in front of me. Thank you.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. And I will endeavor to be brief because I know we have a lot of issues to get through.

So this one is a little bit different than the other issues in that we already have a court order which was an agreed-to stipulation about what defendants would agree to produce in response to a series of document production requests relating to two -- or a standard, a lawnmower safety standard and the appropriate CFR regs related to walk-behind lawnmower safety standards.

I won't go through the details, this is all in the brief, of how we got to the point where the Court issued its order. But in response to that order, here is what we received so far.

We received approximately 1,000 different

Consumer Product Safety Commission compliance audit reports.

We received 270 of them by the time the Court issued -- in accordance with the deadlines of the Court, and then we

received about 800 a month later. Mostly, those are the types of documents that we have received.

As you can see from -- you know, nothing in the Court's Order limits the production that defendants expressly agreed to to adjust CPSC audit reports. And I can give you an example of that. And we put this in our brief relating to presentations, reports, memos, meeting minutes, et cetera, that relate to regulatory compliance.

That would encompass more than just the CPSC audit. So, for example, perhaps there was communications or discussions between two defendant employees about any particular CPSC audit or making sure that a certain accused product was compliance with, you know, certain standards or certain regulations that are at issue here. And we haven't seen any of that.

And so that is the troubling part of all of this is that it was clear from not only before the Court issued its order but after the Court issues its order, after the defendants already agreed to it, that they were going to be providing documents in response to Requests For Production Nos. 102 through 104 and 106 through 115 subject to an agreed upon limitation, but nothing in that limitation limited the documents to just these CPSC audit reports.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me ask you that what specifically is missing from the CPSC audit

report produced by those defendants that requires them to produce, as you say, documents showing planning and preparing for the auditing process, training materials, for example, explaining or describing the auditing process to employees?

What do you expect to find outside of these audit reports that are not cumulative of all of the information that these audit reports give you about compliance with the standard and the CFR?

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Sure, Your Honor. And the thing is, you know, obviously we don't necessarily have an expectation of what we would receive because we don't know what documents they have in their possession. But, for example, these CPSC audit reports list a series of, as you might guess, testing requirements for various aspects of lawnmowers. And if there are communications or presentations discussing the compliance with certain of these standard or regulation requirements, that may give us insight into how defendants are interpreting the structure of their products, for example, that could potentially go to invalidity.

I think maybe, you know -- and this is perhaps a little, a little half baked, but it would also possibly go to damages as well as to understand how exactly they interpret the various features of their products and what

purposes they serve, including whether or not they served to comply with one of the required standards or regulations.

THE COURT: All right. And I'm looking at the stipulation, and it indicates that the defendants shall provide a response to Plaintiff Interrogatory No. 13 and Requests For Productions 102 to 104 and 106 to 115 with the following limitation:

"Plaintiff shall narrow the scope of each of these requests to responsive information and documents limited to the standards in CFR as they relate to the accused products."

My question is in the course of fashioning and agreeing to this stipulation, how did each side define for the other, if it did, what is meant by responsive information and documents?

I'll just leave that phrase out there. How did you define what that was? Did you spell out, for instance, for the defendants what was contemplated by Chervon that they would produce beyond the audit report?

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Well, certainly, Your Honor.

And I think a little context will help here.

The scope of the Request For Production 102 to 104 and 106 to 115, they set forth what we received.

And admittedly -- and which is why, you know, plaintiffs ultimately agreed to this stipulation. We agreed to

narrow those original requests which said something like,
for example -- and I'm just, this reflects Request For
Production No. 13: "All internal documents, including
presentations reports, memos, and meeting minutes relating
to consumer safety and the accused products."

So, for example, the issue is with consumer safety. That is way broader than just the specific CFR reg and the specific ANSI standard that is identified in the stipulation.

So that narrowed the world of responsive documents and information just to the internal documents relating to consumer safety or, for example, the next RFP, regulatory compliance, to just those standards, to just the ANSI standard and the CFR standard and the accused products.

So in other RFPs, it might not have been limited to just the accused products. So in that sense, the stipulation then brought the world of relevant products that we're looking for the documents relate to only the accused products.

And that is still clear, that is still true. We aren't looking for CPSC audit reports, for example, relating to non-accused products. We don't need communications or other internal documents or presentations that specifically talk about regulatory compliance of non-accused products.

We don't need presentations relating to the

accused products that are talking about a different standard other than the ANSI standard or the relevant CFR reg, you know, listed in the stipulation.

THE COURT: So my question is this: So you're competitors in this space, so plaintiffs must have an understanding that discovery relating to lawnmower safety standard is largely in the form of these CPSC audit reports. And in light of that, didn't the plaintiffs talk to the defendants about wanting more than the audit reports?

Even if not a single audit report had been produced by the time you entered into this stipulation, and maybe you ought to clarify that for me if there was, did you have any of the defendants' audit reports at the time you entered into this stipulation?

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Your Honor, I'm not 100

percent sure that we did or didn't. I think we did not.

Certainly, the vast majority were produced after that,

after the stipulation. But in any event, we certainly did

discuss with defendants' counsel the other Requests For

Production that perhaps call for documents other than the

audit reports. And that is listed in Request For

Productions 102 to 104 and 106 to 115.

THE COURT: Well, why wasn't that spilled out in the stipulation? You have already had a dispute about these interrogatories and Requests For Production being

overbroad.

You make the big step with one another of successfully meeting and conferring to narrow it to discovery related to lawnmower safety standards. And again, I'm speaking very generally.

Why didn't you further narrow it in the stipulation that it's got to be a document beyond the universe of simply these CPSC audit reports that you are looking and list the type of things that you're looking for? Because as I read this responsive information and documents limited to, as they relate to the accused product, that is limited to the standard and the Code of Federal Regulations relating to those safety standards and regulations.

That doesn't really tell the defendants or prepare the defendants for a discovery dispute like this where you tick off: planning and preparing for auditing, the auditing process, training materials, et cetera. You were very specific in your papers to the Court, but I'm not reading that in the stipulation, and I can't imagine that there wasn't a discussion of that. And if there wasn't a discussion of the granular types of categories of documents plaintiffs were looking for, how could you truly expect the defendants to comply?

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Your Honor, respectfully, I think that information is in the stipulation. And that is

why we included a specific reference to the specific request for production numbers that implicated the various types of documents that plaintiffs were searching for as they related to regulatory compliance and lawnmowers.

And the nature of the stipulation, the nature of the narrowing was taking what we've requested in relation to the standards and regulations and limiting those requests just to one specific standard and/or I should say two: one specific ANSI standard and one specific CFR reg and the group of the accused products narrowed from lawnmowers generally.

So, respectfully, I do believe that the parties were in agreement, and we did discuss that what we were looking for is laid out explicitly in the Documents Request For Production.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from defendant One World on this.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank you, Your Honor. And good afternoon again. This is Sean Cunningham for One World for the defendants.

I think I want to start with three points.

No. 1. I can confirm, Your Honor, that all of the audit reports, which we attached an example of as Exhibit 1 to our submission, Document Item 148, all of the audit reports were produced after the parties entered into

the stipulation, and, in fact, that stipulation is what led to that production. So the 1,086 audit reports that we have produced are post-stipulation. So that is point 1.

Point 2 is there was no discussion of what I'll refer to as these ancillary documents. So the presentations, planning documents, training documents, there was no discussion of that at the time we entered into the stipulation or for a period of time after that. I believe the first time we saw reference to these ancillary documents was in the November time frame of last year.

And the proof of that, part of the proof of that, Your Honor, is in the original briefing before Judge Stark. And I'm referring in particular to Docket No. 97 which was the plaintiffs' filing of the original dispute.

I don't see any reference to these specific types of documents in that submission. And I am not aware of any discussion of these ancillary documents in the days and weeks leading up to the entry of the stipulation.

So "responsive information and documents," which is the phrase that the stipulation that you pointed counsel to, we believe was -- were fully satisfied by the production that we did make, which was not just the audit reports but also the standards themselves.

So as Your Honor I think understands, the audit reports fully respond to the interrogatory. We haven't

heard much discussion of the interrogatory. The interrogatory asks for each product, whether it complies with the standard, how it complies with the standard, and when it complied with the standard. So those three pieces of information.

And the audit reports themselves answer all three of those pieces of information. They answer whether -- and that's, by the way, Your Honor, the "whether" is obvious because under the law, you cannot sell one of these lawn mowers in the United States until you passed this compliance testing.

So in order to sell a lawnmower in the country, you have to comply with these audits. So the "whether" is answered by the fact the product is on sale.

But then the "how" is answered by the compliance column, the green column in these audit reports, and each specific test that is set forth in there.

And then the "when" is obviously there is a date on each of these audit reports that shows when each product passed compliance.

So we believe that our production in this regard was utterly complete as to all of the these RFPs. But I want to make sure -- there is one point I want to make sure doesn't get lost here. And that is when they first -- after we made this production and after we answered the

interrogatory, and after we had completed what we believe to be our compliance with the stipulation, they then raised, well, we want more. We want these presentations, we want planning documents, we want training documents.

We actually went back and searched for those things and confirmed with nem that we do not have anything further to produce that would be responsive to the RFPs at issue. And so we have confirmed for them that our production in regards to this is complete.

And so for an issue like this that is at tangential to a patent infringement case, that it doesn't involved standard essential standard patents, doesn't involve allegations of infringement that are based on these safety standards, I submit to Your Honor that we have more than satisfied our discovery obligations with respect to this issue.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Your Honor, may I respond?

THE COURT: You may respond, Mr. Levinstein.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'm looking at Docket No. 97 as well. And for defendants to say that they had no idea we were seeking these other documents, the first sentence under the first heading, and indeed the first heading itself specifically references the Request For Production at issue here: 102 to 104, 106 to 115. They made it into the first discovery

dispute before Judge Stark. They made it into the stipulation. For defendants to claim that they don't, they didn't know that we wanted this, I can't understand how that can be. I'll leave it at that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: And, Your Honor, I'm sorry.

To be clear --

THE COURT: Briefly respond. Sorry, go ahead.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: To be clear, my point is there is no reference in that letter to presentation. There is no reference in that letter to training material. There is no reference in that letter to planning material. There is no reference in that letter to communications about the standards, which, by the way, would be governed by -- and we'll get into this I'm sure later -- an email, an email limiting the agreement the parties have in this case.

But putting that aside, there is no reference to these specific types of ancillary documents in the letter to Judge Stark. And there was no discussion between the parties about those documents until well after we had completed our production. And to be clear, we have confirmed with them that we do not have any such documents.

THE COURT: Has that been confirmed in a formal response to the Request For Production in issue?

MR. CUNNINGHAM: No, Your Honor. It was done in

a meet and confer, but I am happy to issue supplemental RFP responses that confirm that in writing.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Your Honor, may I?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Matthew Levinstein again.

And I don't want to blow this whole issue up because I think a lot of these same issues are going to come up as we discuss the other aspects of plaintiffs' discovery disputes.

But it's with this, you know, confirmation that nothing else exists, and it's with this, well, they never asked for A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K.

But that is not true. We did ask for those, and we did ask for those in our Requests For Production.

And frankly, and you will know, by the way, we structured our other discovery letter that had the nine categories of documents corresponding to a whole group of RFPs. That we're at a loss at what to do here because they keep telling us they're producing everything but they're not producing the documents that we would expect to find here.

So when does the burden shift and no longer become incumbent for us to ask for the documents as we've asked for numerous times? And then for them to say, well, they never asked us for A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L,

M, N, O, P? Because we have asked for those, and we put those in the stipulation for this exact reason.

THE COURT: All right. I think I heard enough on this issue, and I'm prepared to make a ruling.

Again, this ruling is subject to what I put on the record about the objections under Rule 72(a).

With respect this request to compel defendants to comply with the stipulation ordered by Judge Stark, and the stipulation document item number is Document 103.

I will grant it in part. And this is the fashion in which I am granting it. In my view, I am not going to broadly interpret use of the phrase "information and documents" that used in the relevant paragraph of this stipulation. I will narrowly interpret it in accordance with what appears to the intent of the stipulation to narrow the scope of the request for production.

I will grant the motion, and I will ask and order that defendants supplement their response to the Requests For Production at issue with respect to production of any presentation, any documents relating to planning and preparing for the auditing process that resulted in these auditing reports being produced with respect to as they relate to the accused products and also to supplement with respect to any training materials explaining or describing the auditing process to employees of the defendant as they

relate to the accused products.

If, in fact, the defendants have nothing to supplement, then they shall so state in their response to these Requests For Production. Defendants have made a reasonable search and their production is complete.

I will not compel the defendants to provide any further type of detailed certification or response at this time other than to represent that they have made a reasonable search for the ancillary documents the Court has ordered that they search for and produce, and that their production is complete if they cannot locate any of these documents.

Obviously, if documents can be located, they are to be produced. And to be consistent with the deadlines we've been discussing in this case, I'll ask that that be done on or before January 28th.

So that is my ruling with respect to this motion.

Any -- I'm sorry?

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Understood, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Let's move on and give me a moment to transition to the most voluminous set of briefing and exhibits that I received with respect to our conference today. Just give me a moment.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: All right. So the next series of requests pursuant to a motion to compel in the plaintiffs' again motion, vis-à-vis defendants' responses to certain discovery obligations.

There are approximately nine bullet points and an additional dispute with respect to noninfringing alternatives.

With respect to the nine bullet points, it's my preference to go bullet point by bullet point, resolve each one consecutively rather than speaking about all nine as a whole.

In light of that, if any of these nine have since been resolved, that would greatly help the Court.

Otherwise, my instructions stand as I gave them at the beginning of this conference. Please be succinct and direct about describing to the Court specifically what is deficient and what relief plaintiffs are seeking the Court to order.

But let start with the first one which is organizational charts and document retention policies.

Who is going start on behalf of the plaintiffs?

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. This is

Matthew Levinstein for plaintiffs.

And I agree that it will be helpful to attack this on a bullet-point-by-bullet-point basis, but I will

start by saying that a lot of the same arguments will apply to each of these bullet points, and so I won't repeat them.

And the other kind of general point that I
want to make sure the Court is aware of here is that this
isn't an ordinary motion to compel in that we're asking
for documents the defendants have said that they are not
producing them because of undue burden or relevance, et
cetera, et cetera.

They're saying they have searched and they have given us everything they had, and we don't believe that to be the case.

So I'm not sure how the Court wants us to address the legal side of these arguments about, you know, what we need to show in order to have the Court compel defendants to go back and redo their document search, give us their search protocol and certify that their productions are complete.

So a little guidance that would be helpful because I want to make sure I am telling the Court what it wants to know here.

THE COURT: Well, what I want to know is why you suspect, why the plaintiffs suspect these responses are deficient? Some may be more readily determinable than others. So let's start at the beginning with organizational charts and document retention policies.

is sufficient in some sense.

The exhibits attached by Chervon reflect that the defendants did in fact produce organizational charts.

So I am at a loss as to what I should read into that, that allows the Court to conclude, as plaintiffs avers, that this

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor. And the reason for that are -- actually, there are multiple reasons. The first is the nature of the case. And I won't get into details, but you know that these are large parties.

Defendants are a group of international companies. You know, I should say companies that are doing business on an international level. They have identified numerous individuals, at least 10, that have relevant information.

And frankly we would expect there to be more, more organizational charts than the four or so that they have provided. But at a minimum -- and again this dovetails with the other categories that we have identified -- if this is it, then we want that in writing, that they're certifying their production because, you know, we're all patent savvy attorneys or I would say judges here. That we know what we're expecting when we receive a document production, and we just haven't received it with respect to organizational charts and document retention policies. And again defendants have told us that they don't have document retention policies.

Okay. Again, that strikes us as somewhat surprising, but if that is the case, then we would expect them to be willing to certify that.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from who is going to address it on behalf of the defendants.

MR. BIGGS: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon. This is Brian Biggs from DLA Piper on behalf of the defendants.

Your Honor, as the plaintiffs have just alluded, there are going to be some themes that are going to permeate all these bullet points. So if I may take a minute at the outset to lay some of the context?

Plaintiffs just mentioned that these are large international companies, sophisticated companies. And that is true. But one thing to keep in mind is that the accused products here are a very small piece of defendants' business.

So TTI has many, many brands in its portfolio:

Milwaukee Tools, Hoover, Dirt Devil. And so One World and

Ryobi are just one piece of it. And then if you drill down

further -- and pardon my use of the pun of drills with Ryobi

products. But if you drill down further and look at One

World, there are several business units within One World

that are unrelated to the mowers.

And, Your Honor, if I may direct you to

defendants' submission on this point, Exhibit No. 1.

You see that even within Ryobi, one of the organizational charts, Your Honor, just mentioned, you will see even within Ryobi, of those several business units, you can drill down even further within those business units.

Here, we see a org chart for the 2020 cordless product development team. So this is not even the entire scope of One World's Ryobi business unit.

Mowers is just that left-hand column. You see under Ryan Kropfelder, Senior PM for Mowers, there are several types of mowers. All right? So we're not even talking about the right two columns. And within mowers, we're not even talking about all three of those product managers. Right? Riding mowers are not at issue here. Snow/tour not at issue here. What we're talking about are just push mowers.

And you can even drill down further than that, right? The accused products are not all push mowers. In fact, the lion's share of the market, today at least, are gas powered mowers. Gas powered mowers are not at issue. Corded mowers are not at issue. We're just talking about battery powered walk-behind mowers.

So to plaintiffs' point that these are sophisticated parties, this, what we're talking about here is a very small piece of the defendants' overall business.

And I would like to provide Your Honor, if you would permit me, some context on the investigation that defendants have made to date. And I don't want to get into a work product or attorney client privilege communication, but I think I can given you at least the high level points to show that the investigation has actually been fulsome and impressive in my mind.

Counsel, DLA Piper has worked with in-house counsel at TTI One World that is sophisticated, knowledgeable in litigation.

We've identified potential custodians and noncustodial data sources. And, in fact, we have worked with in-house counsel over 20 custodians. All right? And that includes custodians in product development; right? More than 10 custodians in that group, starting with the Senior Vice President all the way down.

We've worked with the engineering team, at least five custodians starting with the Senior Vice President all the way down.

On the financial team, we went all the way to the Chief Financial Officer, and worked with her and with the Chief Financial Officer and her report.

And then in the marketing, again, we started with the Senior Vice President and worked from there.

So the investigation has been fulsome, right?

We interviewed witnesses, the custodians, and then performed the collection based on those interviews.

But that is not where we stop either, right?

Throughout the meet-and-confer process, which has been lengthy, we have worked with Chervon. That after we have made our productions based on our understanding of the scope of the production, we have entertained what Chervon thinks is missing, and then we dutifully go back to our client.

We have done this over and over again through out this, throughout the discovery process. And where we eventually got to I guess our impasse, and which I'm still not entirely sure what plaintiff is asking for at this point, on our recent meet and confers, we explained to them, look, we have looked for those documents. They do not -- based on our reasonable investigation, we have not found responsive nonprivileged documents to produce. We're not withholding anything.

And frankly, Your Honor, on the most recent meet and confer on this issue, I was told that they just don't believe us. And I'm not really sure where to go from there.

If the resolution is at the end of the day today that we certify that in writing as you just ordered us to do on the prior dispute, so be it. I think that is something I think we're happy to do, but I'm not sure what other sort of order that the Court could make that we could even carry out

from there.

And one last point that I would note is that one thing we've been, we've been sort of surprised about throughout this process and it is coming to a head with some of the other discovery disputes is the fact that plaintiffs are ignoring the email discovery limits that we had negotiated earlier on in the discovery period.

THE COURT: All right. We'll get to those in a moment. And I think we have limited time. I do have other matters in other unrelated cases on my calendar this afternoon, so I'd like to get through these bullet points and find a path going forward.

I do appreciate, though, Mr. Biggs, thank you for the background information. And we'll try to address everything as we go along.

I do have one question with respect to the organizational charts.

To the extent you have narrowed the universe of accused products to these battery powered walk-behind mowers, does the organizational chart produced to the plaintiffs adequately respond to their discovery requests for an organizational chart that relates to that decision or portion of defendants' business that is responsible for manufacture and sales of these battery powered walk-behind mowers?

MR. BIGGS: They do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anything further to produce as far as you know with respect to organizational charts on that?

MR. BIGGS: No, Your Honor. This is not actually something that the client keeps in the ordinary course of business. The same thing with the document retention policy. And so there is nothing further to produce.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask, with respect to the document retention policies, the words that struck out, stood out for me when I reviewed defendants' response at Document Item No. 151 was that defendants did not have a written document retention policy to produce.

And I'm not sure if that meant that there was some other form of document retention policy that there was perhaps an individual who stored these document retention policies in his or her head, and that is how they're maintained.

There is some -- I need some clarification to that response, qualifying document retention policies by what you have written.

MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, that's a fair question.

And we were not trying to be coy with the use the word

"written" there. It is simply an acknowledgment of the fact

these are Requests For Production. We don't have documents to produce that reflect the document retention policy. I think the caveat, if anything, is just to suggest that there are retention policies that, you know, just as a business that functions, they're retaining stuff in some way but not in any sort of written, formal form.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further,
Mr. Levinstein?

You may be on mute. I'm not hearing you.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: I'm so sorry, Your Honor. I was on mute. I will be very brief.

In response to Mr. Biggs' context that he provided about what defendants have done to search for documents, I think the "elephant in the room" is if they have conducted what Mr. Biggs describes as a robust search, why aren't they willing to explain that in detail in something they submit to the Court?

And it sounds like they're at least willing to certify the production, but the biggest "elephant in the room" is where are the documents? Where are the documents?

They produced 1,700 pages in this case. I'm sorry, 1,700 documents I believe in this a case, give or take. And I think a thousand of those are CPSC reports.

And so I know that doesn't help Your Honor in terms of the specific document retention policies, but that

is the difficulty of having us prove a negative here.

And so what we've tried to do with our briefing is identify from the specific categories but also the context in which these document requests were served, you know, for the case and the nature of defendants, et cetera, why we don't believe that document search has been fulsome in this case.

THE COURT: Well, a couple of points here.

With respect to organizational charts and document retention policies, when I hear an argument from the defendants that -- a response, that is, from the defendants that they have searched and have produced everything that they can come up with in their searching that is responsive, I rarely, unless I have reason to believe otherwise, rarely do I, can I fashion or can any court fashion an order compelling a party to produce that which it does not have.

All I can do in this instance is require the party saying that they have satisfied their production obligation to formally respond in a supplementary fashion to the outstanding Request For Production that they have made a reasonable search and have produced all responsive documents completely. That is what I can do.

Unless the plaintiffs or the movant, whichever party it is, in this instance the plaintiffs, but unless you

can come up with something that is indicative from the response that you have got already that, for instance, refers to another document that was not produced or refers to perhaps an individual who has not been disclosed throughout the remainder of the discovery as it has been progressing and someone hasn't been able to have those documents as a records custodian or otherwise or email custodian, whatever, unless you can come up with something that supports a belief, suspicion, speculation, whatever you want to call it, that there should be more but we haven't got it, there is little the Court can do because rulings cannot be made on speculation and conjecture in the face of an Officer of the Court representing that a reasonable search has been made and all responsive documents have been supplied and disclosed.

So with respect to -- go ahead. I'm sorry.

Does that provoke a comment or a question or an inquiry?

MR. LEVINSTEIN: No. I think that everything you said, Your Honor, is absolutely fair with the exception of what we would also like, at least with the organizational charts and document retention policies, and again I don't know that this is something that defendants could provide on a bullet-point-by-bullet-point basis, because I know that is not necessarily how a document collection goes, but we would like to understand what they have done in detail to produce

that in its submission in addition to certifying the production is complete.

Now, for other bullet points, as you'll see as you get further down that have some more meat on the bones there, we do believe that we have evidence that rises above the level of speculation that additional documents exist.

But at least for the organizational charts and document retention policies, we think it's a fair ask given the type of case this is, given the scope of production thus far that plaintiffs -- that defendants, excuse me, not only certify the production but tell us what they've done to get to that point.

THE COURT: Again, the Court needs something more than a suspicion to order that level of detail. And perhaps when the parties are taking depositions of fact witnesses, should there be questions posed as to if a witness is shown a document, you know, where its source is, how it is kept in the ordinary course of business, whatever, that raises a question about the representation that a complete search and a complete response was made, then maybe at that point -- I mean there are instances in other cases where perhaps a record custodian deposition could be ordered by the Court to explain the level of the search that was done for a particular universe of documents.

But for the Court to order nine of them, this is

at this time, based on this record, I'm not inclined to go down that path, at least not on this record.

So let's take each of these individually. And for the organizational charts, the document retention policies, I'm going to deny the motion to compel, but as I did with the previous request, I will compel, order the defendants to indicate formally rather than just on this record and in the meet and confers respond formally to the Request For Production relating to these which are identified in plaintiffs' submission in a formal way that a reasonable search has been conducted and the defendants have no further documents to provide. Their production is complete. So I will ask that that be done with to organizational charts and document retention policies.

Let's move on. And, Mr. Levinstein, if you are going to address the next bullet point, which is documents relating to the plaintiffs and the inventors, litigation, et cetera, my first question to you, perhaps that you can address it at the outset, is: What are the parties doing about a privilege log?

It seems to me that this request for these specified Request For Production numbers tread into areas that might be met with a claim of privilege. And I don't know if the parties have discussed or made an agreement about what to do about privilege logs, if any.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Matthew Levinstein again.

I have to say that I don't know off the top of my head if the parties have an agreement yet on privilege logs or what they're planning to do.

I'm not sure if may colleague James Lukas has anything to add on that, but I'm not aware of it right now.

MR. LUKAS: I'm not either.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LUKAS: This is James Lukas.

THE COURT: Thank you both, counsel.

All right. Mr. Levinstein, what are plaintiffs looking for here, and what we do believe? Because no nonprivileged documents have been produced. As defendants say, that there must be something there that is nonprivileged that defendants ought to be producing.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Sure. Well, at a minimum, we would certainly want anything that defendants contend are privileged to appear on a privilege log. And certainly following this call, I've already made a note that we need to figure that out with the other party. And I assure the Court that we will do that and work together to figure something out in terms of privileged documents.

So setting aside for the moment, again, given the fact that these companies are literally the No. 1 and

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No. 2 lawnmower competitors at, or were at Home Depot, it strikes me as incredibly odd that defendants have produced, they claim it is eight documents relating to Chervon. can't understand how there could only be eight documents relating to Chervon, even if you limit it to just the accused products or lawnmowers. So just from that starting point, given that they haven't produced very much if at all on this topic, I don't have other documentary evidence to point the Court to, but certainly you would expect them to have documents relating to Chervon particularly with respect to the subject matter at issue here, the products at issue. All right. Let me hear from THE COURT: defendants. MR. BIGGS: Thank you, Your Honor. And I start off, I apologize --THE COURT: Is this Mr. Biggs again? MR. BIGGS: My apologies, Your Honor. Brian Biggs again. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. BIGGS: Thank you. I do not want to sound like a broken record, but

I do not want to sound like a broken record, but
I think you are going to hear the same response from me for
at least the next couple of bullet points.

Again, we have conducted a search. We have

produced everything we found that is responsive and nonprivileged.

I think Your Honor has hit on a point here that some of this stuff is likely to be privileged. And, of course, when the parties -- and I can confirm our understanding as well is that the parties have not broached the subject of privilege logs, but if we have communications that should be logged, of course, they will show up there.

The one thing I think is also helpful, which was the third point of sort of the overarching context I wanted to raise, which is related now to Bullet Point No. 2 here is the idea that the parties negotiated an email production protocol.

What I'm hearing from Mr. Levinstein is that they're expecting more communications. And the parties agreed on how email production would be limited, and it's in that Exhibit 15 to our responsive submissions on these issues where on March of 2020, plaintiffs' counsel proposed that we limit email discovery to five custodians, five search terms following the default temporal limitations and use only narrowly tailored search terms. And, thereafter, plaintiffs served on defendants an email request identifying the five custodians they wanted, the five search terms they wanted.

And, Your Honor, in those search terms, there

were terms that covered Ego, which is the branded name of the Chervon mower, and Chervon itself.

And I should say, to continue how that process occurs, there is one term that defendants objected to. It was a term that was focused on blowers. Blowers are not accused in this case, so we objected on that basis.

So we ran the other four search terms over those custodians. And to give Your Honor a little bit of additional context, we received another set of email requests from Chervon with one additional term, presumably to get to that fifth search term that we had agreed to initially.

And so, Your Honor, we've run those terms over those custodians and we have produced what we had.

Our understanding -- and I think this is -well, I know this is indicative of the way that I conduct
cover discovery and use these e-mail agreements -- is that
is the scope of the email discovery. We don't then have a
further obligation to go dive through everybody at One
World's emails for responsive documents.

So if that is what plaintiffs are asking, I think we're at just a fundamental impasse on that issue.

But I will say other than diving into email boxes of a bunch of additional, a bunch of additional custodians that they've never identified for us or anything of that nature, what we have done is the fulsome

investigation I discussed before. We talked to each of the custodians. We looked for everything in response to their RFPs, and we've produced what we found.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Your Honor, this is Matthew Levinstein. May I respond?

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

I think as we're learning over the last few days but also right now on this call, I think there is fundamental disagreement over the scope of email production in this case.

Yes, Your Honor has I believe before heard the agreements relating to email requests as the parties agreed to. That was in no way shape or form designed to limit or somehow forego the other parties' obligation to search through emails for responsive documents or even if it's in response to an interrogatory.

What we envisioned that to be was a separate way to propound email requests to avoid the situation where someone says I want 50 custodians to be searched for 10,000 terms, you know, just the word "circle," things like that, but we certainly did not intend to that to limit the scope of what would otherwise presumably be included in a reasonable search for documents in response to document production requests.

So I'm not sure how the Court wants us to handle that now or if we should be handling that off-line, but that is going to come up over and over and over again, I presume based on what Mr. Biggs just told us for every single bullet point here on out.

THE COURT: I see that as a problem, too,
because responsive documents to specific requests for
production are not limited to responsive emails. There is
a larger universe there whereas email discovery is email
discovery, and that is where the parties get together and
determine how many custodians will be searched and how many
search terms. You know, in this case, the parties agreed
to something less than is typical in the Court's default
standard, and that's fine. The parties can again stipulate
and agree to whatever mutually works in any particular case
because as we know each case is different.

But Requests For Production aren't necessarily

-- aren't then a subset of email discovery. Request For

Production are independent requests for production. I think

that is where the disconnect may be here. And as I said,

there is also the issue of the parties walking around

perhaps the issue of privilege and holding back documents

that may be privileged in the absence of any privilege log

being produced.

And I'm open to suggestions, but I'm inclined

not to address all of these nine bullet points today until
the parties have a further meet and confer about what
plaintiffs are specifically seeking and how there may be
other documents out there beyond the email of the custodians
who have been searched and what defendants can do to assure
that a search beyond emails has resulted in production of
all responsive nonprivileged documents.

And along the same lines, I would like the parties to take the opportunity to begin that discussion of when and how to put together a privilege log for both sides to put together privilege log so that we can address any claims of arguments relating to what is on the privilege log in due course.

I'm not sure how I can go bullet point by bullet point if it is the defendants' position that they've searched within the confines of the parameters of the email custodians and email search terms but not otherwise with respect to those topics. So if I'm misunderstanding what the defendants have done, I'll give them an opportunity to clarify, but I'm not inclined to go further with this type of gap until the parties have met and conferred further.

MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, this is Brian Biggs for defendants again. If I may?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BIGGS: So I actually do think, and I

apologize if I was unclear in my prior recitation of the way we conducted the discovery, because the way we conducted the investigation based on the RFPs was independent of the email protocol.

So when we went and asked the custodians for documents, it was not, hey, only tell me about non-email documents. It was what documents do you have that relate to this.

What I was suggesting was that, what the parties had agreed to so that we don't have to go through exhaustive email discovery was to agree to certain parameters. So when we conducted the search under the RFPs it was not limited to only non-emails, it was more so that the comment was to reflect that to the extent they're seeking emails specifically beyond what, you know, the general RFPs are requesting, that is covered by the RFP or the email agreement. So I didn't want to mislead the Court, suggest that we intentionally excluded emails from our initial searching.

And one other point that I would note, Your

Honor, is that -- and I allow plaintiffs to please correct

me if I'm wrong about this, but -- sorry. Please correct me

if I'm wrong about this, but I don't believe Chervon has

produced a single email yet.

Now, we have not propounded email requests on them yet, and so that might be why. But if what they're

suggesting is that we should have conducted a large fulsome investigation into all the emails of all the folks at One World beyond the custodians we interviewed, that is not what

So I thought that those two points of context might be helpful for Your Honor.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Your Honor, this is Matt Levinstein. May I respond to that?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

Chervon has done with their production either.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: I am now very confused. As to the scope of One World production, and I want to be very clear with the Court about what it is that we sought. We explained our interpretation of the stipulated email requests that we had agreed to with the other party.

But our document requests also covers ESI, as they should. It explicitly includes emails. And I don't believe that defendants objected to any of our RFPs on the basis that we were seeking emails and we have a separate full, the total email production stipulation that governs every single email produced in the case.

So I think I agree with Your Honor that what we need to do is we need to sit down. The parties need to sit down and figure out what is the overall scope of email production, because, again, understanding now that they haven't even searched for email responses or maybe they

searched for email responsive to RFPs, maybe they haven't,

I'm still not 100 percent sure, how is it possible that

there is not a single email? Maybe they produced one. How

is there only one email between defendants and the Home

Depot, their exclusive retailer for accused products at

issue here?

So I guess my mind is spinning a little bit, and I do think the parties need to get together on this.

THE COURT: All right. I think that is a necessity because I don't know how I can resolve these, and despite my ruling on the record about not being comfortable ordering production based on the absence of a larger production, there are certain bullet points here that do cause the Court to question just what the scope of the search was, how thorough it was, if there was some reliance upon an agreement for the email protocol and number of custodians that made the search narrower than it perhaps should have been.

I'm not saying that anything intentional or nefarious was committed, but I'm just saying that the parties may just be operating on different pages, on different levels with respect to what the mutual understanding is of the production obligations here.

So I think it would be helpful that I defer ruling on these bullet points without prejudice for the

parties to meet and confer about a number of things about these nine bullet points, about the scope of the mutual agreement with respect to email searching and production and also with respect to privilege logs as we have discussed previously. And then depending on the outcome of that, the Court will permit plaintiffs to raise issues that I deferred on this case.

Now, I'm not going to promise to do that on the 28th because I want to give the parties some instructions about what we will be accomplishing at the next discovery dispute hearing on January 28th in a moment, but I do think that the parties need to meet and confer on these points and do that very promptly as soon as both sides are available to do that and well before I hear the next round of issues on the 28th.

So let me just ask, I'll ask Mr. Levinstein first and then Mr. Biggs may weigh in.

With respect to the last item that was briefed with respect to the discovery dispute on plaintiffs' motion to compel, the identification of "meet each noninfringing alternative," is that something that is captured by what we've just been discussing on these nine bullet points or is that independent of it? And can we address that last issue raised by plaintiffs on this call?

Let me hear first from Mr. Levinstein.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Your Honor, thank you. I believe it is an independent issue that can be addressed on this call.

THE COURT: All right. Then I give you the floor to address it.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. So Interrogatory No. 5, as you said, is requesting specific information regarding the identification of acceptable noninfringing alternatives.

This is a very common request in patent infringement cases. It relates in the lost profits context.

And just to give a very brief background on that.

One of the tests to determine whether a patentee is able to obtain lost profits requires a patentee to show that there are no acceptable noninfringing alternatives, meaning that if the consumers couldn't purchase the accused products, they wouldn't have necessarily purchased the patentee's product, they would have purchased some other third-party product.

THE COURT: Yes, I appreciate your explanation and the background, but I think the disconnect here, at least as I read the defendants' response is, again, the scope of it. Is it the entire lawnmower is the accused product because the other side isn't seeing it that way?

They're looking specifically at the handle mechanism. And I

think that disagreement, so to speak, between the parties is what is generating perhaps the disputes that I have in front of me. And I need to find out how to cut through that and just what the scope of discovery is that plaintiffs are seeking here.

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Sure. And, Your Honor, respectfully, I think defendants' response is a red herring. The claims, as you know, the claims state what the claims state. Most of the claims are directed to lawnmowers, but regardless of that, this is about what products are being sold.

And we're not talking about selling individual replacement handles here. We're talking about the sales of lawnmowers. You know, what lawnmower? Could someone who purchased an accused product purchase instead of the patentees, instead of Chervon's product, and so that is why the specific identification of lawnmowers.

And for defendants to come back and say every single lawnmower that is compliant with the ANSI standards and the CFR regulation is a noninfringing alternative, they're missing the point of the interrogatory.

The interrogatory asks for identification of acceptable noninfringing alternatives.

And they claim in their response to Interrogatory
No. 5, they being defendants, that all of their mowers are

acceptable noninfringing alternatives. Of course as the Court understands, those are accused of infringement here, and this is a disagreement over infringement.

But then they say every third-party lawnmower that is compliant with the standards is a noninfringing alternative. They do not state that it is an acceptable noninfringing alternative. We don't know what defendants believe to be acceptable noninfringing alternatives.

If they are going to come out and say every single lawnmower that is compliant is an acceptable noninfringing alternative, that is a non-answer because that includes gas mowers. That includes if the mower -- for example, this is off the top of my head, if the mower blade deck is 20 inches wide. This could also include mower blades that are, decks that are 12 inches wide or 40 inches wide. And it's just, it's not an acceptable answer.

We need a list, plain and simple, of which lawnmowers they contend would be acceptable to consumers as noninfringing alternatives if those consumers couldn't purchase the accused products.

THE COURT: All right. I'll hear from defendants' response.

MR. BIGGS: Thank you, Your Honor. Brian Biggs from DLA Piper again.

And I will respond to a couple of points, but I

think we have a proposed resolution which is I, through the briefing, I think I finally understood, finally, what they're asking for. And I think we can actually provide what Mr. Lukas just asked for.

But to provide a little bit of context.

THE COURT: Mr. Levinstein -- I'm glad. I'm on the same page with you, and I appreciate your proposal to find a solution.

MR. BIGGS: Yes. So, Your Honor, a couple things I would state.

The acceptability issue, which as I understand what Mr. Levinstein was objecting to, is addressed by the response. The response says: Any product on the market that meets the standard, the ANSI standards and the standards we discussed earlier today.

And so if it is acceptable and it meets the standard, is on the market and people buy it, I think that is a reasonable factual basis to rely on them as noninfringing alternatives.

But if the question is really he wants a list of which noninfringing alternative that we intend to rely upon, you know, in expert discovery and at trial, we're happy to provide that list. That that is not a problem. That is something if that resolves the dispute, we're happy to do.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BIGGS: I'm sorry. I was just going to say obviously we need to discuss the reasonable scope, but maybe that is something we can further meet and confer with plaintiffs about. But if ultimately what they're asking for is a list of the ones we're intending to rely upon, that is easily done.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Levinstein, anything further?

MR. LEVINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes.

That is that is acceptable so long as they identify

everything they intend to rely on for the entire

noninfringement period.

THE COURT: All right. Then I will order the defendants to supplement their response to, I think it's Interrogatory No. 5 which is at issue with respect to the noninfringing alternative and do it in the fashion described on the record. And -- I'm sorry. Go ahead. Is someone speaking or maybe that was just an echo -- and do it in the fashion that has been discussed on this record.

And can that be done, Mr. Biggs, on or before January 28th, to be consistent with the deadline for other obligations the Court has ordered in this matter?

MR. BIGGS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

All right. So let me turn to January 28th. I

looked at the two joint requests for teleconference to resolve discovery disputes that were docketed at 126 and 147. And as you know, I set those for discovery teleconference starting at 2:00 p.m. on January 28th. Looking at them, I see 12 issues, bullet point issues collectively when I read both of those motions.

I would like the parties to meet and confer to narrow that and to narrow that to half. I don't want to deal with 12 issues. There is just simply not enough time even if I spent the entire afternoon from 2:00 p.m. dealing with it. And I certainly don't want to be presented with hundreds or perhaps a thousand pages of exhibits to go along with all of those 12 issues.

So I'm asking that the parties, and I guess these are all plaintiffs' issues, that you narrow it down to six and that you brief it within the four-page limitation on letter briefing that the Court has within the deadlines set in my oral orders. I think the opening submission is due on January 25th, and the responsive submission is due on the 26th, so each four page submission.

If, for some reason, the parties cannot narrow that down to six, and if, for some reason, the letter briefing requirements are inadequate -- I also want to put the brakes on the number of exhibits presented with. I will give each side no more than 100 pages of exhibits to go

along with your respective letter briefing.

obstacles or a problem or you can't narrow it down to six, I want a joint letter sent to me on or before January 20th before the briefing even begins explaining what the difficulty is and what the parties jointly propose to do about it in terms of if you are seeking expansion of page limitations, expansion of the 100 page limit on exhibits. Fill that out for me in the joint submission of no more than four pages in a letter due on or before January 20th.

And if the requests are reasonable, I'll consider it. But as you can probably understand, we've spent a couple hours here today and we didn't even get through those nine bullet points. I'm just concerned about having enough time to address all of the issues presented.

And based on what I have heard on this call, I think if the parties sit down and really try to talk to one another and perhaps not, you know, in a more meaningful way, I think you will probably reach some agreement, if not agreement at least an understanding of what the point of these motions to compel are, what the goal it is in terms of the discovery sought, and maybe that will at least clarify some issues and reduce the number that the Court has to address.

So that is my order for the next time we get

1	together.
2	With that, is there anything further from the
3	plaintiffs that I should address on this call?
4	MR. LUKAS: Your Honor, James Lukas for the
5	plaintiffs.
6	Nothing else for the plaintiffs. Thank you.
7	THE COURT: All right. Anything further on
8	behalf of the defendants?
9	MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, Brian Biggs from DLA
10	Piper on behalf of the defendants.
11	No. Thank you so much for your time. We really
12	appreciate it.
13	THE COURT: All right. Thank you, everyone, for
14	your time and for trying to comply with my request for being
15	direct and succinct. You did a fine job, and I appreciate
16	it. Everyone stay safe, and we'll meet again on January
17	28th. Thank you.
18	(The attorneys respond, "Thank You, Your Honor.")
19	(Telephone conference ends at 3:00 p.m.)
20	
21	I hereby certify the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript from my stenographic notes in the proceeding.
22	
23	<u>/s/ Brian P. Gaffigan</u> Official Court Reporter
24	U.S. District Court